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I.

INTRODUCTION

Employers use groom and dress policies to broadly regulate the
appearance of employees, dictating all aspects from the most basic
appearance requirements, such as cleanliness and proper attire, down to
the minutest details, including hair style, nail length, and even lipstick
color.1 However, when an employer differentiates between male and
female employees in appearance policies, the employer runs the risk of
violating Title VII, a federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in
the workplace.2 Title VII was enacted to eradicate the discriminatory
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes, and to
eliminate the traditional obstacles faced by women entering the
workforce.3 The Supreme Court has held that Title VII prohibits an
employer from differentiating between men and women in a wide
variety of employment settings, including application qualifications,4
promotion decisions,5 and retirement plans,6 but has not yet addressed
whether policies that regulate aspects of an employee’s appearance fall
within the ambit of Title VII. In the absence of Supreme Court guidance,
circuit courts have developed multiple, often conflicting tests to determine
whether an employer runs afoul of Title VII when it imposes different
appearance requirements upon male and female employees. This Comment
proposes a comprehensive framework for analyzing groom and dress
1. For example, see Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy as detailed in Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), which heavily
regulated the appearance of female employees by allowing only specific nail polish
colors and hair styles while mandating makeup in “complimentary” colors. See infra
text accompanying notes 16–20.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
3. The U.S. Supreme Court once noted:
“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. [Title VII] subjects to
scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities and
enjoyment which have plagued women in the past.”
City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
4. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971) (holding
that an employer’s policy of refusing applications from women with school-aged
children while accepting applications from men with school-aged children violated Title
VII).
5. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (holding that an
employer’s refusal to promote an employee, motivated by stereotypical notions about a
woman’s proper demeanor, violated Title VII), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
6. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711 (holding that an employer’s requirement that
women make larger contributions into the company’s pension fund than men violated
Title VII).
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policies under Title VII that will ensure consistency among the circuits,
remain faithful to Supreme Court precedent, and restore focus on the
original intent of Title VII.
Part II of this Comment introduces Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Co., a controversial Ninth Circuit opinion that illustrates both the myriad
problems encountered in existing groom and dress tests as well as the
advantages of this Comment’s proposed approach. Part III explores the
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of Title VII to prohibit both blatant
and subtle forms of employment discrimination arising out of sex
stereotypes.7 Despite this expansive precedent, many courts have utilized
theories that impose limitations on the protections of Title VII against
discriminatory groom and dress policies.8 For example, one of these
tests is the mutability doctrine, which bars any consideration of
appearance policies under Title VII by asserting that Title VII prohibits
discrimination only on the basis of immutable characteristics.9 Another
is the offensive stereotype analysis, which further limits the application
of Title VII by allowing courts to impose or withhold statutory
protection based on subjective views of the permissibility of certain
gender stereotypes.10 The unequal burdens test also undercuts the
strength of Title VII by only looking to the financial and temporal costs
of complying with a groom and dress policy, thus failing to consider the
psychological burden of being forced to conform to an oppressive sex
stereotype.11 As Part IV of this Comment asserts, the mutability doctrine,
the offensive stereotype analysis, and the unequal burdens test all serve

7. Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination as well as discrimination
resulting from a general practice or policy. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”).
8. Indeed, these limiting tests may have developed as a method to balance the
apparent breadth of the statute with employer prerogative. Though there is considerable
merit in the notion of balancing the rights of employers with those of employees, this
Author believes that the existing circuit court tests unduly limit the ability of employees
to use Title VII for its intended purpose—to fight sex discrimination—in favor of a
nearly unrestrained right of employers to impose discriminatory appearance policies.
9. The mutability doctrine was widely adopted in the decades following the
passage of the Civil Rights Act by courts in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits and the D.C. Circuit. See infra Part IV.A.
10. The offensive stereotype analysis has been applied to groom and dress polices
by courts in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits and the D.C. Circuit. See infra Part
IV.B.
11. The unequal burdens test was developed and is used primarily by courts in the
Ninth Circuit. See infra Part IV.C.
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to limit the effectiveness of Title VII by creating various exceptions and
loopholes within the statute’s blanket prohibition against sex discrimination.
Ironically, these theories often result in allowing employers to promulgate
groom and dress policies that reinforce the very stereotypes and employment
obstacles that Congress intended to eliminate with the passage of Title
VII. Thus, in Part V, this Comment urges the Supreme Court to address
the inconsistencies among the circuits by implementing a new, twopronged approach to groom and dress policies under Title VII.
This new framework rejects the mutability doctrine as a misinterpretation
of Title VII language and Supreme Court precedent, but it retains and
refines aspects of the offensive stereotype analysis and the unequal
burdens test. The first step in the proposed approach asks the Court to
consider whether the policy relies upon stereotypes that tend to reinforce
gender subordination in the workplace, rather than simply focusing on
whether the Court deems the policy subjectively offensive. The second
step of the test requires the Court to engage in an expanded unequal
burdens analysis by examining a broader variety of factors—including
the financial, temporal, physical, and emotional costs of the policy—to
determine whether the policy imposes a heavier burden on one sex over
the other. This new approach remains faithful to legislative intent and
Supreme Court precedent by addressing and eradicating the special
barriers and disadvantages faced by women in the workforce. Properly
applied, the two-pronged test harmonizes employee and employer
interests by targeting policies that further gender inequality while still
allowing employers to maintain reasonable discretion over groom and
dress requirements.
II. DARLENE JESPERSEN
Imagine a woman faced with this distressing ultimatum: conform to
her employer’s stereotypical notions about the way women should look
and compromise her self-dignity, or stand her ground and lose the
successful career that she has cultivated for nearly twenty years. This
was the situation in which Darlene Jespersen found herself when her
employer, Harrah’s Casino, informed her that she would be terminated if
she refused to comply with the extensive new makeup requirements that
applied to female employees only.12 Jespersen had worked as a bartender at

12. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
2004), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. CV-N-01-0401-ECRVPC), 2002 WL 32980097 (“Consequently, Ms. Jespersen refused to comply with the
makeup requirement, and, she was terminated.”).
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Harrah’s in Reno, Nevada, for almost two decades.13 Over the course of
her career, she received performance appraisals ranging from “successful”
to “exceptional” and emphasizing her reliability, positive attitude, and
ability to remain calm in the high volume, fast-paced atmosphere of
Harrah’s Sports Bar.14 By all accounts, Jespersen was a valuable and
popular employee. She was abruptly terminated, however, due to her
strong objection to and refusal to comply with Harrah’s newly instituted
“Personal Best” appearance policy.15
The policy imposed a variety of groom and dress requirements on
employees, some that applied to all employees, regardless of sex, and
some that applied only to male or female employees.16 All employees
were required to wear the specified uniform—consisting of a white shirt,
black pants, a black vest, and a black bowtie—and to appear “well
groomed.”17 As to the gender-specific requirements, male employees
were prohibited from growing their hair below the collar and wearing
makeup or nail polish, while female employees were required to wear
stockings, adorn colored nail polish, and wear their hair “teased, curled,
or styled.”18 Harrah’s later amended the “Personal Best” policy to require
female employees to apply a daily facial uniform of makeup, including
face powder, blush, mascara, and lipstick in complimentary colors.19
Under the policy, supervisors monitored female employees daily,
comparing their appearances to photographs taken after the companyhired image consultants performed a “makeover” on every woman.20
Jespersen had never worn makeup in either her personal or professional
life. On a personal level, she refused to wear makeup because it
“conflict[ed] with her self-image” and she found it “offensive.”21 On a
professional level, she felt so uncomfortable wearing makeup at work

13. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
14. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Employee
Evaluations, Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (No. CV-N-01-0401-ECR-VPC), 2002
WL 32980105.
15. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106.
16. Id. at 1107.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004),
aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
21. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
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that she found it interfered with her job performance.22 She stated that
she felt “sick, degraded, exposed, and violated” when forced to wear
makeup to work.23 In addition, Jespersen found that wearing makeup
actually impaired her ability to be an effective bartender because her
customers, especially the drunken, unruly ones, viewed her as less credible
and authoritative when she was “dolled up.”24 Although Harrah’s had
promised that the new policy was about “looking and feeling your
best,”25 it demanded that she comply with the makeup requirement or
she would lose her job.26 Despite increasing pressure from Harrah’s
management, Jespersen refused to wear the required makeup uniform.27
After twenty years of “exemplary” service, Harrah’s terminated Jespersen
for her decision not to comply with the makeup requirement.28
Unfortunately for Jespersen, the courts provided no relief. After
exhausting her administrative remedies,29 Jespersen filed suit against her
former employer in district court, alleging that the Personal Best policy
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.30 Title VII
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex or national origin,” unless the discriminatory policy is a

22. Id.
23. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
24. Id.; Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight
Against the Barbie-fication of Bartenders, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 298–99
(2007).
25. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, Exhibit C,
Beverage Department “Personal Best” Program (emphasis added).
26. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D. Nev.
2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Defendant told her that compliance [with the policy] was mandatory. When
Plaintiff still refused to comply . . . . Defendant thereafter terminated Plaintiff’s employment.”).
27. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada et al. in
Support of Plaintiff/Appellant at 4, Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 03-15045), 2003 WL
24133171 [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
28. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2006).
29. Amicus Brief, supra note 27; Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. Under Title VII, a
plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to the statute’s provisions must file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days “after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). If, however, the
plaintiff first institutes proceedings with a state or local agency “with authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice,” the time for filing a charge with the EEOC is extended
to 300 days. Id. Here, Jespersen first filed suit with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission
and then filed her Title VII discrimination claim with the EEOC. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at
1108. For further discussion of the procedural requirements of filing a Title VII discrimination
claim, see EEOC, FEDERAL L AWS P ROHIBITING J OB D ISCRIMINATION : Q UESTIONS
AND ANSWERS (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html. See also Russell Specter &
Paul Spiegelman, Employment Discrimination Action Under Federal Civil Rights Acts,
21 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (1974).
30. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1189.
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“bona fide occupational qualification.”31 In court, Jespersen asserted
two theories of sex discrimination. First, she argued that the policy imposed
an unequal burden on female employees by requiring a daily facial uniform
of makeup, while male employees had no equivalent facial requirement.32
Second, Jespersen argued that the makeup requirement was impermissibly
based on sex stereotypes.33
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted Harrah’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that the Personal Best policy
imposed equal burdens on both male and female bartenders and that the
policy was not impermissibly based on sex stereotypes.34 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed Jespersen’s Title VII challenge to the Personal
Best policy twice: first in 2004 before a three-judge panel,35 and again in
2006 following a rehearing en banc.36 In the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
rejected Jespersen’s unequal burden claim due to her failure to develop a
record regarding the financial and temporal cost of complying with the
makeup requirement,37 and it rejected her sex stereotyping claim due to
her failure to prove that the Personal Best policy was impermissibly
motivated by offensive sex stereotypes.38 Applying these standards, the
Ninth Circuit put an end to Jespersen’s legal battle.
With the facts of Jespersen and other circuit authority as a backdrop,
this Comment will illustrate that the theories and tests relied upon by
courts across the country misinterpret the language and intent of Title
VII and undermine Supreme Court precedent.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (e)(1) (2000). Title VII permits an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sex in those instances in which sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business or enterprise. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The BFOQ defense is a very narrow
statutory defense and turns on the particular facts and circumstances of the job at issue.
E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). Here, because Harrah’s did not
argue that the “Personal Best” policy constituted a BFOQ, this Comment will not engage
in a comprehensive analysis of the BFOQ. For information and sources regarding the
BFOQ defense, see infra note 114.
32. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107–08.
33. Id. at 1108.
34. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93. Regarding Jespersen’s sex stereotyping
claim, the district court specifically held that the policy did not violate Title VII because
it did not discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race, sex, or
national origin. Id. at 1192–94. This theory will be addressed infra Part IV.A.
35. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d on
reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
36. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
37. Id. at 1110.
38. Id. at 1112–13.
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III. TITLE VII: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE SUPREME COURT
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination
in a broad variety of settings, including voting rights, public
accommodations, schools, government agencies, and employment.39
Title VII of the Act specifically prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any individual in “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment” on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin,”
unless the discriminatory policy fits into the bona fide occupational
qualification defense.40 However, the initial draft of Title VII did not
include sex as a protected category, and the last minute addition of sex to
the bill left courts and commentators with little legislative history to help
guide the statute’s interpretation.41
One prevalent theory is that congressional opponents of the civil rights
legislation proposed the addition of sex in order to load down the bill
with politically unfavorable features in an effort to defeat the entire Civil
Rights Act.42 However, others assert that this theory fails to adequately
explain the strong, repeated support for the sex amendment in the House
and Senate.43 Despite any questionable motives of the members who
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (e)(1) (2000). For example, Title VII prohibits an
employer from taking tangible actions, such as termination, demotion, or reduction in
pay or benefits, based on discrimination against a protected class. More specifically, the
Supreme Court established that the statute’s provision on sex discrimination also
prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, based on either a hostile work
environment claim or a quid pro quo claim of sexual extortion. See Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986). However, the Court has not yet spoken directly
regarding whether a groom and dress policy may violate the Title VII sex discrimination
provision.
41. See, e.g., Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63–64 (“The prohibition against discrimination
based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of
Representatives. . . . [T]he bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little
legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination
based on ‘sex.’”).
42. See Arthur B. Smith, Jr., The Law and Equal Employment Opportunity: What’s
Past Should Not Be Prologue, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 504 (1980) (“The sex
discrimination prohibitions of Title VII have no legislative history: the provision was
added as a tactic by Southern congressmen to secure defeat of the civil rights bill’s race
discrimination provisions.”); see also Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments:
The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of
Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 453 (1981) (“The conventional view is that
sex was added as a protected class to the employment discrimination title of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 . . . for the purpose of defeating it by making it unacceptable to some
of its supporters or by laughing it to death.”) (footnote omitted).
43. For further discussion on why the conventional explanations of the sex
amendment fail, see Gold, supra note 42. Gold argues that the conventional explanations are
inadequate because they are inherently unlikely, especially considering Congress does
not often pass laws based on a “joke”; they provide no assistance in construing the sex
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initially proposed the sex amendment, both the House and Senate
approved the amendment with the requisite majorities,44 and Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act without a single change to the sex
discrimination provision.45 Further, legislative reports issued in the wake
of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII spoke forcefully against sex
discrimination, and emphasized the importance of enforcing the sex
discrimination provision of Title VII with the same vigor and
seriousness as the rest of the protected categories.46 Today, most courts,
including the Supreme Court, have come to agree that by adding sex as a
protected category under Title VII, Congress intended to eradicate the
offensive and outmoded sex stereotypes that limit employment opportunities
for women.47 Thus, when employers use discriminatory groom and dress

discrimination ban; and “they do not account for the remarks of Representatives who
spoke in favor of the amendment.” Id. at 460. Gold’s close examination of the
congressional record on that day in fact reveals a serious debate about the amendment,
primarily focusing on whether white women would be left without protection unless the
sex amendment passed. Id. at 463–67.
44. See Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 176–77 (1991) (describing how, on
February 8, 1964, the House approved the “sex” amendment 168 to 133); Gold, supra
note 42, at 461 (noting that, on February 10, 1964, the House approved the amendment
again on a revote).
45. See 110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964); see also Gold, supra note 42, at 457.
46. For example, after the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, Senators Clifford
Case of New Jersey and Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, the bipartisan comanagers of the
Act, issued an interpretive memorandum of the bill, which provided broad support for
the prohibitions of Title VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 7212–14 (1964). The memorandum
encouraged the use of an expansive definition of discrimination. Id. at 7213. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has often relied on the Clark-Case Memorandum to clarify legislative
intent behind Title VII. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982); Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350–51 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1971). A few years later, in 1972, the House Committee on
Education and Labor also issued a report on Title VII that specifically addressed sex
discrimination. The report stated:
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. . . . Such blatantly disparate
treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has
specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964. . . .
Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited
employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern
given to any type of unlawful discrimination.
H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4–5 (1971).
47. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir. 1971)) (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”); Rodriguez v. Bd. of Educ.,620 F.2d 362,
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policies to impose stereotypical image—policies that ultimately hinder
women in achieving professionalism and respect in the workplace—those
employers effectively undermine Congress’s goal of dispelling sex
stereotypes.
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the
implications of Title VII for groom and dress policies, the Court has
applied Title VII sex discrimination in the analogous contexts of
employment qualifications and employer decisionmaking. Two landmark
decisions provide crucial guidance to lower courts. The first decision,
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., established what many courts and
commentators call the “sex-plus” doctrine, which expands Title VII
to prohibit the more subtle method of discrimination on the basis of
sex plus an otherwise neutral characteristic.48 In Phillips, an employer
refused to accept employment applications from women with preschoolaged children, but it had no similar restriction against employing men
with young children.49 The Supreme Court first noted that Title VII
requires “that persons of like qualifications be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex,” and thus held that maintaining
one employment standard for females and another for males constituted
Title VII sex discrimination.50 Although significant for its application of
Title VII to employment qualifications, the majority opinion in Phillips
was extremely brief and did not explain the Court’s reasoning. Justice
Marshall’s more demonstrative concurrence, however, has since gained
regard as the opinion that created the sex-plus doctrine.

366 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[S]ex stereotyping may once have been a virtually unquestioned
feature of our national life, [but] it will no longer be tolerated.”); Austin v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (“The legislative history
accompanying the passage of the 1972 amendments makes clear that the primary thrust
of Title VII was to discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment
disadvantages for one sex.”).
48. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971). One
observer noted:
Although the Phillips Court’s terse opinion did not offer any detailed
explanation for its conclusion that the plaintiff at least had made a prima facie
showing that she had been subjected to a sex-based employment practice, it did
not take the lower courts long to draw an ill-conceived doctrine out of the
Court’s sparse text. . . . A facially sex-differentiated policy that excluded a
sub-group of women could, in the absence of a BFOQ-based justification,
violate the statutory ban on sex-based discrimination. . . .
The lower courts promptly fashioned a broad limitation to the Court’s ruling
in Phillips—the doctrinally misleading “sex-plus” theory.
Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 207 (2007) (footnotes
omitted).
49. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
50. Id. at 544.
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In his concurrence, Marshall first asserted that by adding the
prohibition against sex discrimination to Title VII, “Congress intended
to prevent employers from refusing to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”51 Marshall then wrote that
where “performance characteristics” of employees or applicants are
concerned, “employment opportunity may be limited only by employment
criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.”52 Thus, an
employer may not condition performance characteristics on gender. As
lower courts applied and interpreted the Phillips opinion, the sex-plus
doctrine came to stand for the principle that discrimination against a
subclass of one sex violates Title VII as much as discrimination against
the entire sex.53 In other words, an employer may not discriminate on
the basis of sex plus an otherwise neutral characteristic—for example,
being female plus having young children.
In 1989, the Supreme Court issued another significant Title VII sex
discrimination opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.54 For the first
time, the Court acknowledged that an employer violates Title VII when
it relies upon sex stereotypes in making employment decisions. In Price
Waterhouse, the plaintiff, a senior manager at an accounting firm, was
denied partnership despite her great success with the firm, and then told
by a partner to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry” in
order to improve her chances for reconsideration.55 Other partners
described her as “macho,” told her that she “overcompensated for being a
woman,” and advised her to take “a course at a charm school.”56 The
Court broadly stated that Title VII required that “gender must be irrelevant
to employment decisions,” and thus, “[t]he critical inquiry . . . is whether
gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was
made.” 57 The Court then held that the partnership decision was
51. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 547.
53. See Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (W.D. Mo.
1979) (“[The sex-plus] line of cases rests on the theory that disparate treatment of a male
or female subclass violates Title VII since the employer has added a factor for one sex
that is not added to the other sex as a condition of employment.”).
54. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 251 (1994).
55. Id. at 235 (citation omitted).
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 240–41 (emphasis omitted).
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impermissibly motivated by stereotypical notions about a woman’s
proper demeanor and by the plaintiff’s apparent failure to conform to
gender stereotypes.58 Further, the Court noted, “[W]e are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .”59
This deceptively simple statement paved the way for a new method of
attacking sex discrimination in the workplace: the sex stereotyping
claim.60 This claim allows plaintiffs in Title VII cases to introduce
evidence that an employment decision was made, at least in part, due to
a sex stereotype.61
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of Title VII
in Phillips and Price Waterhouse, circuit courts have responded to
groom and dress challenges by creating various limitations and
exceptions to Title VII’s broad prohibition against sex discrimination.
As Part IV will explain, these theories are unsound because they
contradict Supreme Court precedent, misinterpret the purpose of Title
VII, and allow employers to perpetuate the same sexist stereotypes that
Title VII intended to eradicate.
IV. A CROSS-CIRCUIT ANALYSIS OF GROOM AND DRESS
POLICIES UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Mutability Doctrine: An Absolute Right to Discriminate?
The mutability doctrine imposes a tremendous limitation on Title VII
by interpreting the statute to prohibit discrimination based only on
immutable characteristics that cannot be changed, such as sex, race, and

58. Id. at 256.
59. Id. at 251.
60. The sex stereotyping claim has met some success in Title VII groom and dress
challenges. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–
33 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring women to wear uniforms but allowing men to wear
business attire was based on “demeaning” stereotypes about women); O’Donnell v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
(requiring female sales clerks at a retail store to wear smocks, while allowing male sales
clerks to wear a shirt and tie, perpetuated sexual stereotypes); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (holding that employer may not base its
regulations on gender stereotypes, such as “women are the weaker sex,” without
violating Title VII). But see Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215–16 (8th Cir.
1985) (requiring female news station anchors to appear feminine and soft on the air was
not based on impermissible stereotypes); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
402, 402–03 (D.D.C. 1972) (requiring short hair for males was not an attempt to
stereotype employees). For further discussion of the sex stereotyping claim, see infra
Part IV.B.
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51.
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national origin.62 Under this doctrine, groom and dress policies could
never violate Title VII because an employee’s appearance is alterable.
Thus, under the mutability doctrine, a policy that discriminates between
men and women based on appearance does not, and indeed cannot,
constitute sex discrimination.
The view that groom and dress policies cannot violate Title VII is
most strongly expressed in the first notable group of groom and dress
challenges brought after the passage of Title VII. Known as the “haircut
cases,” these cases involved a male employee challenging an employer’s
appearance policy that prohibited long hair for males but had no
equivalent hair length restriction for females.63 A majority of federal
courts upheld the hair length policies,64 reasoning that Congress intended

62. The mutability doctrine was widely adopted by courts in the decade following
the passage of Title VII, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and the D.C.
Circuit. For example, the Fourth Circuit held:
[D]iscrimination based on either immutable sex characteristics or
constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or child rearing violate
the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964] because they present obstacles to employment
of one sex that cannot be overcome. . . . [However,] discrimination based on
factors of personal preference does not necessarily restrict employment
opportunities and thus is not forbidden.
Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976). See also
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the basis of “immutable characteristics, such
as race and national origin”); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir.
1974) (holding that Title VII addresses discrimination based on characteristics that “the
applicant, otherwise qualified, ha[s] no power to alter”); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register
Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Congress has said that no exercise of that
responsibility may result in discriminatory deprivation of equal opportunity because of
immutable race, national origin, color, or sex classification.”); Thomas v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (holding that distinctions in
employment practices between men and women on the basis of something other than
immutable characteristics or legally protected rights do not inhibit employment
opportunities in violation of Title VII); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp.
141, 145 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (“Rules and regulations of employers based on personal,
mutable characteristics of men, used by the employer to choose one or more men over
other men in the various aspects of employment, do not discriminate against men on the
basis of sex.”) (emphasis omitted).
63. For an examination of the historical and legal issues involved in the haircut
cases, see Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75–80 (1995).
64. See, e.g., Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975);
Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092; Baker, 507 F.2d at 898; Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488
F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1126. But see Aros v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that a hair length
restriction for male employees violates Title VII: “A dress and grooming code . . . must
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for sex to be interpreted in the same way as the other protected
categories of race, color, and national origin. In doing so, these courts
interpreted Title VII to forbid discrimination only on the basis of
immutable characteristics.65 Because hair length is a mutable characteristic,
policies regulating hair length for men simply do not implicate the rights
and protections of Title VII.66
The mutability doctrine should be discarded because it directly
contradicts Supreme Court precedent. In Phillips, the Court invalidated
an employer’s policy against hiring women with school-aged children,
holding that employers could not have one hiring policy for men and
another for women.67 Justice Marshall’s concurrence further instructed
that “[w]hen performance characteristics of an individual are involved,
even when parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may
be limited only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of
the applicant.”68 This case suggests that a policy based on mutable
characteristics may be found to violate Title VII, as having children of a
certain age is not an immutable trait, but was still considered by the
Court to be a discriminatory criterion. Correctly interpreting the Phillips
opinion, the Seventh Circuit in Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc. invalidated
an employer policy that required only female employees to be
unmarried.69 The court held that enforcing the no-marriage rule against
women but not men constituted sex discrimination.70 Although marriage
is a mutable trait, the court deemed it to be a discriminatory distinction,
which again undermines the central premise of the mutability doctrine.

be applied equally to everyone. It may not establish different standards for males and
females; it may not discriminate on the basis of sex”).
65. See Baker, 507 F.2d at 897 (“Since race, national origin and color represent
immutable characteristics, logic dictates that sex is used in the same sense rather than to
indicate personal modes of dress or cosmetic effects.”); see also Willingham, 507 F.2d at
1092 (“Private employers are prohibited from using different hiring policies for men and
women only when the distinctions used relate to immutable characteristics or legally
protected rights.”).
66. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“Equal employment opportunity may be
secured only when employers are barred from discriminating against employees on the
basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national origin.”) (emphasis
omitted).
67. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
68. Id. at 547 (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971). The
court noted that Congress specifically rejected an amendment to Title VII that would
have limited the prohibition to discrimination based “solely” on sex, and reasoned that
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination that adversely affects only a portion of a
protected class. Id. at 1198 & n.4. Thus, distinguishing between married women and
unmarried women was discriminatory. Id. at 1198.
70. Id. at 1198.
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The inherent contradiction between these cases and the earlier haircut
cases demonstrates that the mutability doctrine cannot be salvaged.
Perhaps predicting this criticism, the Fifth Circuit attempted to
conform the mutability doctrine to Supreme Court and other circuit court
precedent by holding that Phillips and Sprogis dealt with “fundamental
rights”—the fundamental right to have children and to marry,
respectively—and thus expanded its interpretation of Title VII to prohibit
discrimination based on immutable characteristics or fundamental
rights.71 However, this expansion only serves to illustrate the weakness
of the mutability doctrine, as the exceptions and inconsistencies nearly
swallow the rule itself. Fundamental rights is a relatively broad category
that includes far more rights than simply the rights to marry and have
children, while the mutability doctrine is a narrow rule that limits Title
VII to prohibiting sex discrimination only when it is based on immutable
traits. Thus, the mutability doctrine loses clarity and credibility when
courts expand the theory to include other more expansive categories.
Beyond its inconsistency with precedent, the mutability doctrine
should be rejected because it fundamentally misinterprets the language
of Title VII. A cursory examination of the text rebuts the central
principle of the mutability doctrine because religion is one of the
protected categories under Title VII.72 Although some persons might
consider their religious beliefs inalterable, the possibility of conversion
or lapse and the strong behavioral component of religion support the
assertion that religion is a mutable trait.73 If this assertion is accepted,

71. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091. In this seminal “haircut” case, an employer
refused to hire a male applicant because his shoulder length hair violated the employer’s
appearance policy, which required male employees, but not female employees, to keep
their hair short. Id. at 1087. The court declared that Congress’s main intent in enacting
Title VII was to ensure equal employment opportunity, and that such a goal would be
achieved when employers were prohibited from discriminating against employees on the
basis of immutable characteristics, such as sex, race, color, and national origin. Id. at
1091. Thus, the hiring policy did not violate Title VII because hair length is a mutable
characteristic. Id. In light of the Phillips and Sprogis opinions, however, the court was
forced to admit that a policy based on fundamental rights may also violate Title VII. Id.
Yet the court remained steadfast in its holding because hair length is neither an
immutable trait nor a fundamental right. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
73. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) (noting that protection of religious
beliefs and marital status is an inherent contradiction in American antidiscrimination law
because neither is immutable); Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don’t Ask; If It Is,
Don’t Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 375,
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the mutability doctrine necessarily fails in its inability to account for the
protection of religion under Title VII. As noted by Judge McCree’s
dissent in Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., if Title VII were limited to
immutable characteristics, the prohibition against religious discrimination
would be meaningless.74
The mutability doctrine also wrongly assumes that the only purpose of
Title VII is to provide equal access to the job market, and thus, where
the employer’s policy allows the employee to accept or reject the
grooming requirement along with the job, Title VII is not violated.75
This line of reasoning misunderstands the intent behind Title VII. The
mere fact that the employee has the ability to change his or her
appearance to comply with the policy should be irrelevant under the
statute.76 Title VII is not concerned with whether the employee could
have chosen to conform to the policy.77 If this were true, a policy of
promoting only men to management positions would be considered
lawful because female employees could simply choose to accept the
promotion policy along with the job. This result would be illogical
under a statute that was intended to proscribe such discriminatory policies.
Thus, Title VII’s protections do not turn on whether the employee had
403–04 (1995) (arguing that religion is not immutable because it is not genetic, one can
change religions, and religion is usually defined by behaviors—when and where one
prays, how one lives, and if one wears religious garments).
74. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 403 n.3 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J.,
dissenting) (“It is difficult to understand how such a limitation could be consistent with
the proscription, also within [Title VII], of discrimination because of an employee's
religion. An employee’s religion is certainly not immutable.”).
75. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“If the employee objects to the grooming
code he has the right to reject it by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively
he may choose to subordinate his preference by accepting the code along with the job.”);
see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of
Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 847–48 (1987).
76. Bayer, supra note 75, at 848 (“The fact that the discriminatee may alter
behavior to conform with the policy is immaterial because, under the statute, the
discriminatee does not have to tolerate making such a choice.”).
77. Id. (“Rather, the single appropriate inquiry is whether the alleged discriminatee
has been subjected to a policy, term, or condition based on an impermissible criterion. If
the answer is yes, and if the policy cannot be substantiated by a statutory exemption or
defense, the employer is liable.”). Bayer also provides an interesting hypothetical to
illustrate this point:
Indeed, if the courts subscribing to this line of reasoning are correct, Title VII
would allow a wide variety of policies that contemporary case law has held
illegal. For instance, an employer’s policy refusing to promote blacks from
menial positions might be held lawful. To paraphrase the [Willingham] Court:
“If the [black menial] employee objects to the [promotion] code he has the
right to reject it by looking elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may
choose to subordinate his preference [for opportunity for promotion] by
accepting the code along with the job.”
Surely, the above result is anathema to Title VII policy and practice.
Id. (citation omitted) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
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the choice or ability to conform to the policy, but rather whether the
policy discriminates on the basis of a protected category.78
Finally, the mutability doctrine should be eliminated because it
assumes that Title VII only prohibits discriminatory policies that the court
deems sufficiently important or worthy of judicial review. To avoid
dealing with policies that regulate mutable characteristics, such as groom
and dress standards, courts applying the mutability doctrine have often
asserted that such policies are so frivolous and unimportant that they do
not merit Title VII review.79 For example, in Baker v. California Land
Title Co., the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, instructed that:
[Title VII] was never intended . . . [to] be used to interfere in the promulgation
and enforcement of the general rules of employment, deemed essential by an
employer . . . [and] it certainly should not be used, as the defendant asks us to
do here, to compel the continued employment of an employee who persists in
affecting some whim of style which his employer deems to be inappropriate to
the business image which the employer is attempting to create.80

There, the district court adopted a de minimis approach to the employee’s
Title VII challenge, asserting that the statute was not intended to address
such minor issues.81 The Sixth Circuit invoked a similarly dismissive
tone when refusing to consider the implications of Title VII for an
employer’s appearance policy, stating that “[e]mployer grooming codes
requiring different hair lengths for men and women bear such a
negligible relation to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude
they were a target of the Act.”82 In other words, because mutable
characteristics such as hair length are easily changeable, a grooming and
dress policy, even one that discriminates on the basis of sex, does not
achieve the requisite level of importance for Title VII review. However,
Title VII’s protections do not turn on whether a judge deems the
interests at stake sufficiently important; Title VII simply looks to
whether the policy discriminates on the basis of a protected category.83

78. See id. at 854–55.
79. See id. at 854.
80. Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (emphasis
added), aff’d, 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. See id.
82. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401(6th Cir. 1977).
83. Bayer, supra note 75, at 854–55 (“Certainly, limits have been set on Title VII’s
scope; but Congress established those limits to reach far beyond the narrow
interpretation of mutability analysis. Title VII should not be constrained by a judge’s
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Thus, the de minimis argument dangerously relies upon subjective judicial
attitudes about the relative importance of appearance regulations, rather
than focusing on whether the policy impermissibly discriminates against
individual employees.
Illogically, the de minimis argument allows courts to trivialize
personal appearance while at the same time legitimizing its regulation.84
In the specific context of groom and dress policies, men’s interest in
wearing their hair long has been repeatedly dismissed as minimal, while
employers’ interest in forcing male employees to keep their hair short
has been lauded as significant.85 In Baker, for instance, the district court
described the employee’s refusal to cut his hair as “persist[ing] in
affecting some whim of style” while simultaneously emphasizing the
importance of the employer’s ability to enforce appearance rules and
have complete control over its “business image.”86 However, Title VII’s
protections should not turn on whether the employee has a worthy
reason for refusing to comply with the policy.87 The statute does not
place a higher value on an employer’s interest than on an employee’s.
Although judges serve an important gatekeeping function by ensuring
that court dockets are not bogged down by frivolous or unsupportable
lawsuits, there are effective civil procedures, such as the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, already in place to help judges
concept of what is reasonable. Either a policy discriminates or it does not.”). In a
discussion of the legislative history of Title VII, the Supreme Court also noted that
“Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on national
origin or race, are unlawful.” City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
84. Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73, 73–74 (1982) (discussing the courts’ tendency to trivialize
personal appearance while at the same time legitimating its regulation). For example, in
City of Seattle v. Buchanan, five women appealed convictions of lewd conduct for
swimming topless in public. 584 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1978). The Washington Supreme
Court dismissed the women’s claims about the right to regulate their own appearance as
unimportant, id. at 921, but by upholding the convictions, actually affirmed the
importance of city’s ability to regulate women’s appearance. Whisner, supra, at 74.
85. See Whisner, supra note 84, at 74, and sources cited therein.
86. Baker, 349 F. Supp. at 238. For further discussion on the conflict between
dismissing employees’ interests and emphasizing employers’ interests, see Karl E. Klare,
Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1401
(1992). Klare argues:
There is . . . a tendency to denigrate and demean appearance claims, a faint
suggestion that courts have better things to do with their time than adjudicate
grooming standards. Suddenly the tone becomes somber and the message
almost eerily apocalyptic when judges get to the part of their opinion where
they uphold, as they usually do, the power of employers, school administrators,
and others to visit severe penalties on people who wear nonconforming dress
or hairstyles.
Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Bayer, supra note 75, at 854–55.
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determine whether a particular lawsuit is appropriate for adjudication.88
The mutability doctrine, however, goes beyond these existing procedures
to effectively bar the application of Title VII to any groom and dress
policy, based solely on the assertion that appearance is mutable and thus
not sufficiently important to merit judicial attention.
Accordingly, this Comment recommends the rejection of the mutability
doctrine because it contradicts Supreme Court precedent, misinterprets
the language and purpose of Title VII, and forecloses the possibility that
a groom and dress policy could violate Title VII. As long as courts continue
to utilize the mutability doctrine, groom and dress plaintiffs will be
systematically dismissed, regardless of whether the challenged policy is
rooted in sex stereotypes or imposes a heavier burden upon female
employees. Thus, the Supreme Court should eliminate this doctrine in
order to allow the courts to consider each groom and dress challenge on
its merits.
B. The Offensive Stereotype Analysis: Community Norms
Versus Normative Judgments
The offensive stereotype analysis provides that an appearance policy
violates Title VII if the policy is motivated by demeaning or offensive
sex-based stereotypes.89 Although groom and dress plaintiffs have achieved
some limited success with the offensive stereotype analysis,90 the
analysis is rendered nearly ineffective by the court-created distinction
between offensive stereotypes and commonly accepted social norms.
Because commonly accepted social norms arise out of mainstream
society, they are inevitably informed by the society’s entrenched sexist
88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
89. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir.
1979) (holding that a rule that requires only women to wear uniforms violates Title VII
because “it is based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII.”). The offensive
stereotype analysis has been applied to groom and dress polices by courts in the Sixth,
see infra note 90, Seventh, see Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033, and Eighth Circuits, see infra
note 102.
90. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032–33 (describing a rule requiring women to wear
uniforms but allowing men to wear business attire as “demeaning to women”); see also
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (holding that a rule requiring that female sales clerks at a retail store wear smocks,
while male sales clerks were allowed to wear a shirt and tie, perpetuated sexual
stereotypes and violated Title VII); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1057
(N.D. Ohio 1971) (holding that an employer may not base its regulations on gender
stereotypes, such as “women are the weaker sex,” without violating Title VII).
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and patriarchal attitudes, the mitigation of which spurred the passage of
Title VII in the first place.91 Thus, by immunizing a category of
stereotypes that find justification in the values and images held in the
community, this distinction improperly allows courts to withhold Title
VII protection based on subjective beliefs about whether certain gender
stereotypes are permissible.92 Further, upholding appearance policies by
reference to social norms actually incorporates and legitimizes the very
stereotypes that Title VII intended to eliminate.93
The distinction between offensive stereotypes and community norms
first arose in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n.94 In
Carroll, an employer’s dress code required female employees to wear a
uniform, consisting of either a color-coordinated skirt or slacks and
either a jacket, tunic, or vest, but allowed men in the same position to
wear business suits or business-type sport jackets, pants, and ties.95 By
way of explanation, the employer expressed his concern that female
employees would not have the proper business judgment to choose
appropriate attire:
[T]he selection of attire, of clothing, on the part of women is not a matter of business
judgment. It is a matter of taste, a matter of what the other women are wearing, what
fashion is currently. When we get into that realm . . . problems develop. Somehow,
the women who have excellent business judgment somehow follow the fashion, and
the slit-skirt fashion which is currently prevalent.96

91. Klare, supra note 86, at 1417–18.
92. See Bayer, supra note 75, at 868 (“Only a court’s subjective predilections can
explain a ruling that requiring women to wear uniforms is unlawful, but requiring men to
cut their hair is not.”).
93. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2544
(1994). For an extensive discussion of how legal institutions and civil concepts, like
equality, are rooted in the patriarchal and sexist attitudes that dominated legal
scholarship from the birth of the United States, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991). MacKinnon argues, in
part, that the core of our political and legal system is inherently patriarchal because it
was founded during a time when women had no voice or representation in government.
Id. at 1282–85. She states that “laws developed when women were not allowed to learn
to read and write, far less vote, enunciated by a state built on the silence of women,
predicated on a society in which women were chattel, literally or virtually.” Id. at 1285.
For an introductory examination of how women’s movements have worked to combat
sexism and patriarchy in the law and society generally, see ROSEMARIE PUTNAM TONG,
FEMINIST THOUGHT: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2d ed., 1998). For
example, an early movement called liberal feminism seeks to end female subordination
and systematic sex discrimination by working within the system to obtain political, civil,
and economic equality for women. Id. at 11. On the other hand, radical feminism rejects
the entire sex–gender system as inherently oppressive towards women, and instead
desires an androgynous or female emphasized society. Id. at 45–47.
94. 604 F.2d 1028.
95. Id. at 1029.
96. Id. at 1033 (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original).
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The Seventh Circuit held that the employer’s comments revealed that his
dress code was improperly motivated by an offensive stereotype—that
women cannot be trusted to choose appropriate business apparel—and
that this was the very kind of “offensive stereotype” that Title VII intended
to eliminate.97
Although the Seventh Circuit strengthened the concept of sex
stereotyping for Title VII plaintiffs by properly recognizing that the
employer’s dress code violated Title VII,98 the Carroll opinion also
limited the ability of Title VII plaintiffs to successfully utilize evidence
of sex stereotyping by stating that “[s]o long as [appearance policies]
find some justification in commonly accepted social norms . . . such
regulations are not necessarily violations of Title VII even though the
standards prescribed differ somewhat for men and women.”99 This
sentence, although dicta, opened the door for other courts to justify
discriminatory groom and dress policies by holding that such policies are
based on commonly accepted social norms rather than offensive
stereotypes.100 In doing so, courts rely upon norms and images that are
necessarily informed by the patriarchal and sexist attitudes that Congress
sought to mitigate when it passed Title VII. In this sense, the offensive
stereotype analysis may actually work against the statute’s goals.
The distinction between offensive and commonly accepted stereotypes
should be avoided because it improperly allows courts to permit or
withhold Title VII coverage based on subjective judgments about the
permissibility or worthiness of certain gender stereotypes.101 This problem
is exemplified in the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of the forced feminization
of a local news anchor.102 In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., a female anchor
alleged that she was demoted to the position of reporter due to her
failure to appear sufficiently feminine.103 The court held that she failed
to prove that the station’s appearance policies were impermissibly
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
100. See Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2543–44 (noting that “[e]mployers have
traditionally assumed substantial prerogatives with respect to the dress and appearance of
their employees,” and that “[f]or the most part, courts have rationalized dress and appearance
requirements by reference, directly or indirectly, to community norms”).
101. See Bayer, supra note 75, at 868 (“Only a court’s subjective predilections can
explain a ruling that requiring women to wear uniforms is unlawful, but requiring men to
cut their hair is not.”).
102. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
103. Id. at 1207.
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motivated by “stereotypical notions of female roles and images,”104
despite ample evidence that the station expected all of its female
employees to appear soft and feminine when on the air. For example,
Craft was told to purchase blouses with “feminine touches,” such as
bows or ruffles, because her clothes were “too masculine,”105 and the
station’s appearance consultants took Craft on shopping trips to help her
pick out appropriately feminine clothing.106 The Eighth Circuit noted
that dress policies that violate Title VII are generally based on
“demeaning stereotypes as to female characteristics and abilities or
stereotypical notions of female attractiveness.”107 The court then
concluded that the station’s feminization of Craft was not demeaning,
but simply a result of “the greater degree of conservatism thought
necessary in the Kansas City market.”108 But, as discussed below, Title
VII does not allow discrimination in order to meet customer preference.
Further, the court’s explanation clearly reveals that the court withheld the
protections of Title VII because the stereotypes, which informed the
station’s policies that women should appear soft and feminine, were not
considered sufficiently offensive to constitute sex discrimination. In
this sense, the dichotomy between community norms and offensive
stereotypes incorrectly assumes “that Title VII only proscribes treatment
based on unusual or extreme stereotypes.”109 Such an assumption
undermines Title VII because the statute is rendered ineffective if the
only forms of discrimination it fights are “those which . . . [a court decides]
are no longer socially worthwhile.”110 Title VII’s blanket prohibition on
sex discrimination does not allow for selective enforcement,111 and thus
courts must implement a broader method of discerning which
stereotypes violate Title VII.
The offensive stereotype analysis also fails to fulfill the purpose of
Title VII by allowing courts and employers to justify discriminatory
policies by reference to customer preference.112 As mentioned above, in
Craft, the Eighth Circuit also upheld the station’s appearance policy by
asserting that television is a visual medium and that the station’s
economic well-being depends in part on ensuring that the news anchors
appeal to the customer audience.113 However, Title VII does not permit
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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Id. at 1215–16.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1208–09.
Id. at 1215 n.12.
Id. at 1215.
Bayer, supra note 75, at 868.
Id.
Id. at 855–56.
See id. at 872.
Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215.
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discrimination when the employer can prove that his or her customers
prefer the stereotypical image.114 To the contrary, Title VII makes no
distinction between businesses that serve a small group of customers
with little or no personal contact with employees and businesses that
involve contact with millions of customers, such as a television news
station.115 Moreover, the customer preference argument would allow courts
to apply Title VII inconsistently, basing the statute’s protections on each
jurisdiction’s particular level of acceptance for sexist stereotypes. Such
an approach would only result in more confusion and uncertainty for
both employers and employees under the statute. Title VII’s unambiguous
language and sweeping protections do not provide an exception for
employers that discriminate because their customers prefer a stereotypical
image, and thus, the customer preference argument must be rejected.
Finally, the dichotomy between offensive and commonly accepted
should be further rejected because community norms are necessarily
informed by the discriminatory atmosphere that Congress sought to
eradicate with the enactment of Title VII.116 Therefore, courts that apply
this analysis actually empower employers to reinforce stereotypical
notions about sex and gender through the regulation of appearance.117
By definition, commonly accepted stereotypes arise out of “mainstream
114. As discussed supra note 31, Title VII allows an employer to prove that a
discriminatory policy is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(2000). However, the bona fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) statutory defense is
extremely narrow and imposes a heavy burden of persuasion upon the employer. In
particular, several lower courts have rejected the “customer preference” argument as a
valid basis under the BFOQ defense. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (“BFOQ ought not be based on ‘the refusal to hire an
individual because of the preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients or
customers.’”); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding
that male customers’ preference for attractive female flight attendants does not give rise
to BFOQ exception to sex discrimination). For further discussion of the limits of the
BFOQ defense, see Rachel L. Cantor, Consumer Preferences for Sex and Title VII:
Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 493 (1999).
115. Bayer, supra note 75, at 872.
116. Bartlett, supra note 93 (noting that courts have rationalized dress and
appearance requirements by reference to community norms, an approach that some
scholars criticize as “constitut[ing] an acceptance or legitimation of the very gender
stereotypes that Title VII was established to eliminate”).
117. See Klare, supra note 86, at 1419–20 (“This body of law is obviously based
upon and reinforces stereotypical, gendered views about appearance. To put it another
way, this part of civil rights law has the significant social function of delegating to
employers the power and authority to police and reinforce gender lines.”).
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or conventional norms, which in our society are thoroughly sexist and
patriarchal.”118 Thus, when courts allow employers to punish employees
for deviating from commonly accepted norms, courts facilitate the sexist
ideas and images that Title VII was meant to eliminate. As one legal
scholar noted, “When ‘commonly accepted social norms’ disadvantage
women, the countenancing of an employment practice that takes its
justification from those norms defeats the purpose of a statute proscribing
sex discrimination.”119 Indeed, Title VII was not enacted to follow the
current trends, but rather to eliminate trends when they impermissibly
rely upon sexist notions of the proper roles for men and women.120
When courts allow employers to force their employees to conform to
community norms that are based on harmful sex stereotypes, such
stereotypes thrive and the pervasive sexism in mainstream society
prevents the central purpose of Title VII from being realized.121
C. The Unequal Burdens Test: A Legal Loophole to Discriminate?
The unequal burdens test compares the relative burdens imposed by an
appearance policy upon employees of each sex, and if the court
determines that one group of employees has a more onerous or stringent
burden than the other, the policy violates Title VII.122 This analysis has
been used to strike down facially discriminatory policies,123 as well as
118. Id. at 1417–18.
119. Whisner, supra note 84, at 84 (footnote omitted); see also Klare, supra note
86, at 1415 (“Indeed, in some respects, Title VII powerfully reinforces gender
stereotypes and makes socially constructed gender differences appear to be natural and
unchangeable.”) (emphasis omitted).
120. Similarly, the passage of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972
required schools to end sex segregation in vocational programs. See NAT’L COAL. FOR
WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., TITLE IX AT 30: REPORT CARD ON GENDER EQUITY 21–26
(2002). Prior to Title IX, the vocational education system was purposefully sex
segregated. Id. (“Schools routinely denied girls the opportunity to take classes in shop,
manufacturing, architectural drafting, and ceramics or to attend certain vocational
schools.”) The passage of Title IX meant that schools could no longer discriminate on
the basis of gender in these educational and vocational programs. Id. Thus, equal rights
legislation like Title VII and Title IX must be viewed as affirmative tools to change
social values when they disadvantage one sex.
121. William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit’s
Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards
Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1370 (2006).
122. Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2561 (“Other courts have seemed to engage in a
more qualitative review, implying that the burdens on men and women must be at least
roughly comparable, by some criterion or another.”).
123. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an airline’s policy of requiring only flight hostesses to comply with strict
weight requirements as a condition of their employment was discriminatory on its face
because it applied only to women, not to men). In Gerdom, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished that case from the haircut cases, noting that “no significantly greater
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policies that regulate both men and women but treat one sex less favorably
than the other.124 Although the comparative framework of the unequal
burdens test is appealingly simple, courts should carefully scrutinize the
individual requirements to determine whether the burdens are equal and
should not simply dismiss the claim if the policy has some requirements
for both men and women. Further, the factors most courts consider
when comparing the burdens are generally limited to the financial,
temporal, and occasionally the physical costs of compliance.125 These
factors ignore a key element of the burdens analysis: the emotional cost
of complying with a discriminatory policy.
Courts should examine the policy in its individual restrictions and
requirements, rather than as a whole, to avoid an oversimplified, ledgerstyle inspection of the policy. In other words, considering the policy as
a whole allows courts to simply add up the number of requirements for
each sex and ensure that the number is equal, whereas examining each
requirement of the policy individually allows courts to determine whether
any specific requirement is more burdensome for one sex than the other.126
For example, in Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit stated that the makeup
requirement should not be considered individually but in light of the
policy as a whole.127 Because the policy imposed sex-differentiated
requirements regarding each employee’s hair, hands, and face, the court
held that the policy imposed equal burdens upon both sexes.128 However,
had the court examined the requirements individually, it would have

burden of compliance was imposed on either sex; that is the key consideration.” Id. at
606. See also Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that
an airline can require all flight attendants to wear contacts instead of glasses, but it
cannot require only its female flight attendants to do so).
124. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that an airline’s weight restrictions violated Title VII because the weight limits for men
corresponded to “large” body frames while the weight maximums for women
corresponded to the “medium” body frames, and thus the policy imposed a heavier
burden of compliance upon female flight attendants).
125. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Jespersen’s unequal burdens claim
considered only the time and financial cost of compliance.
126. Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2561. Recognizing this very problem, Bartlett
noted: “Courts have engaged in little or no comparative analysis of the burdens men and
women, respectively, face. In some cases it has been enough that some requirements
were imposed on both men and women, regardless of how burdensome or demeaning
either set of requirements might be.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
127. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
128. Id. at 1109.
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found that each requirement for men corresponded to a requirement that
was at least as, if not more, burdensome for women.129 For example,
men were required to keep their hair “short,” while women were required to
keep their hair “teased, curled or styled” and worn down every day.130
As to the hands, men were merely required to have neat, trimmed nails,
while women had nail length and polish color requirements.131 Finally,
and most noticeably, men were only required to come to work with a
clean face, whereas women were required to wear face powder, blush,
mascara, and lip color in complimentary colors.132 Once the individual
requirements are broken down, it becomes apparent that the Personal
Best policy imposed a heavier burden upon female employees.133 Thus,
courts should apply a qualitative analysis of an appearance policy’s
individual requirements, rather than a facile quantitative analysis that
only ensures that each sex is subject to approximately the same number
of restrictions and rules.
Further, courts should broadly consider the financial, temporal, physical,
and emotional costs of complying with the policy when evaluating the
relative burdens upon employees. Courts have already considered the
physical costs of compliance with groom and dress policies. For
instance, in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., a class of female former flight
attendants alleged that United Airlines’ weight restrictions violated Title
VII by imposing a heavier burden upon women.134 The weight restrictions
were based on a table of desirable weights and heights published by the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, but a closer inspection revealed
that the weight limits for men corresponded to “large” body frames and
those for women corresponded to “medium” body frames.135 In holding
that the policy violated Title VII, the Ninth Circuit took into consideration
the physical costs of the policy, noting that many of the female flight
attendants had jeopardized their health in order to stay within the weight

129. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
130. Id. Although Judge Kozinski agreed with the majority that the makeup
requirement should be considered in light of the entire policy, he still found that the
policy imposed a greater burden upon women and analyzed the policy by breaking it
down into individual requirements. Id.
131. Id. at 1107 (majority opinion).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Even without a record of the money and
time required to comply with the Personal Best policy, Kozinski found it “perfectly clear
that Harrah’s overall grooming policy is substantially more burdensome for women than
for men” by breaking down the individual requirements and examining each for the
burden it imposed on the employee. Id.
134. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. Id.
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requirement by severely restricting caloric intake, using diuretics, and
purging.136
Financial and temporal costs are also significant factors when considering
the burdens imposed upon employees. These costs are easily quantifiable
as the tangible indicia of time and money required to comply with the
policy.137 For example, in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the district
court found that the defendant’s appearance policy violated Title VII by
forbidding women, but not men, from wearing eyeglasses.138 The court
noted that the policy imposed a heavier burden on women because
contact lenses “are substantially more expensive than eyeglasses with
lenses of comparable quality.”139 However, by limiting the unequal
burdens analysis to the temporal, financial, and physical costs associated
with appearance policies, courts ignore the emotional cost of complying
with a discriminatory policy. As the next section explains, the emotional
cost of compliance with an appearance policy is an important factor for
courts to consider because it may indicate that the policy is impermissibly
based upon sexist stereotypes.
V. A NEW APPROACH: RETURNING TO TITLE VII AND
THE SUPREME COURT
Turning to this Comment’s proposed approach, courts should begin by
considering whether the groom and dress policy at issue relies upon
stereotypes that tend to reinforce gender inequality in the workplace.
This analysis avoids the quagmire of attempting to distinguish offensive
stereotypes from community norms and returns the court’s focus to the
original intent of Title VII: eliminating the traditional barriers and
disadvantages faced by women entering the workforce. Feminist and
legal scholar Katherine T. Bartlett writes that although it is true that
community norms are “too discriminatory to provide a satisfactory
benchmark for defining workplace equality . . . . [E]quality, no less than other
legal concepts, cannot transcend the norms of the community that has
136. Id.
137. Jespersen did not have such an easy time of proving the financial and temporal
costs of complying with the Personal Best policy. Because she did not keep a record of
such matters and the Ninth Circuit refused to take judicial notice of the cost and time of
makeup application, she failed to create a triable issue of fact for her unequal burdens
analysis. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106.
138. Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973).
139. Id. at 774.
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produced it.”140 Courts will never be able to provide an objective answer
to whether a certain appearance requirement is offensive or acceptable,
because courts are necessarily informed by the sexist and patriarchal
attitudes that permeate our society. The offensive stereotype analysis
offers what appears to be a clean, objective inquiry—asking whether the
stereotype is offensive—but if considered in a broader social context, the
analysis is embedded in and undermined by sexist societal expectations
and images.
On the other hand, a blanket prohibition on sex-based distinctions in
appearance policies is unrealistic. As one author noted, “In a sexist society,
nothing done by men and women has precisely the same meaning.
Traits are not understood or viewed as isolated technical attributes.
They are necessarily viewed in relation to all of the other traits an
individual possesses and through a systematically gendered lens.”141 For
instance, in Price Waterhouse, the same behavior—aggressiveness and
competitiveness—was interpreted in very different ways according to
the gender of the person performing the behavior.142 Any sex-based
distinction in appearance policies arguably relies upon sex stereotypes,
and the meaning accorded to behavior and appearance is necessarily
shaped by society. Thus, it is illogical, and unrealistic, to demand sex
blindness in employment when sex blindness does not exist in greater
society.
Rather than banning all sex-specific appearance policies, courts should
focus on whether the stereotype reinforces gender inequality and limits
employment opportunities for women. In doing so, courts must examine
the historical and cultural roots of the subordination of women. If the
appearance requirement at issue is based on a stereotype that has been
used to disempower, stigmatize, or oppress one sex, the stereotype is
impermissible and the policy violates Title VII. This analysis will allow
courts to invalidate groom and dress policies that serve to reinforce
women’s lesser status in the workplace while leaving alone the

140. Bartlett, supra note 93, at 2544–45.
141. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a
More Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857,
889 (2006).
142. As Yuracko noted:
It is simply not the case that Hopkins was fired for exhibiting the same
behavior that her male coworkers exhibited. Social meanings are real.
Aggressiveness in women is bitchy in a way that aggressiveness in men is not.
Competitiveness in women is threatening in a way that competitiveness in men
is not. Vulgarity in women is shocking and disturbing in a way that vulgarity
in men is not. Even if Ann Hopkins had engaged in the same types of conduct
as her male colleagues, her behavior would not have been socially the same.
Id. at 890.
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harmless—or even beneficial—sex-specific groom and dress policies.
The comparison of two seemingly equivalent appearance requirements,
that men must wear business suits and ties and women must wear skirts,
provides a useful illustration of this new approach. Both requirements
are admittedly based on sex-specific stereotypes. However, because
business attire traditionally communicates professionalism, confidence,
and respect, a requirement that men wear suits and ties does not degrade
the male employee.143 If anything, the suit-and-tie requirement benefits
the male wearer by allowing him to fit the role of a successful, powerful
employee.144 On the other hand, the stereotype that women must wear
skirts has deep historical and cultural significance to a variety of
demeaning or disempowering beliefs, including the notions that women
are weak, are passive, and should maintain their sex appeal.145 Both
stereotypes are, to a degree, limiting, in that some men may prefer to
wear skirts and some women may prefer to wear pants, but both groups
would be prevented from doing so by a stereotypically sex-based dress
code. However, the skirt stereotype clearly poses a distinct disadvantage
for women seeking to be taken seriously in a business environment by
adding a sexual component to the job. Thus, under the new approach
advocated by this Comment, the skirt requirement would violate Title
VII because it is impermissibly based on a stereotype that reinforces
female subordination, while the suit-and-tie requirement would be left
alone as harmless, or perhaps even empowering, to male employees.
Of course, courts may not be able to completely transcend many of the
patriarchal norms and images built into contemporary social, political,
and legal systems. But by moving the court’s focus from the subjective
concept of offensiveness to historical and sociological studies of gender
subordination and inequality, the proposed approach commands a more
objective review of the policy’s requirements. The goal of this new
approach is not to strip any mention of sex or gender from appearance
policies or impose sex blindness on every aspect of employment, but
simply to recognize and eliminate those policies that compel compliance
with stereotypes that strengthen the traditional inequalities between men
and women in the workplace.146
143. Miller, supra note 121, at 1367.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Of course, an appearance policy that imposes gender-neutral requirements and
restrictions—that all employees wear their hair neatly or that no employee reveal their
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Given the recent strides women have made towards equality in the
workforce, some may assert that the historical connection between
gender inequality and feminine appearance—or more specifically for
Jespersen, the forced application of makeup—is no longer relevant.
However, as noted feminist author Naomi Wolf writes, it is precisely
this progress that requires society to pay further attention to the methods
and forms that gender subordination takes.147 The more progress women
make in work outside the home, “the more strictly and heavily and
cruelly images of female beauty have come to weigh upon us.”148 Wolf
asserts that the advancement in gender equality has resulted in a
backlash against feminism “that uses images of female beauty as a
political weapon against women’s advancement.”149 In the groom and
dress context, the imposition of burdensome and demeaning sex
stereotypes through appearance policies may be viewed as a response to
the increasing number of women gaining expertise and importance in the
workforce. Thus, as women continue to work towards equality with
men in all aspects of employment, the solution is not to back away from
or ignore potentially discriminatory policies, but instead to take up the
goals of Title VII with renewed vigor, and to carefully scrutinize those
policies for requirements that rely on gender inequality.
Had the Ninth Circuit employed this new approach when considering
Jespersen’s sex stereotyping claim, Jespersen would have likely prevailed.
Perhaps assuming that Title VII only prohibits extreme or unpopular
policies, the Ninth Circuit deemed the Personal Best policy to be
“reasonable” and adopted a dismissive attitude toward Jespersen’s claim,
noting that a single employee’s aversion to wearing makeup cannot
serve as the basis of a Title VII challenge.150 However, applying the
approach advocated in this Comment, the court would have examined
the Personal Best policy in light of extensive historical and sociological
studies of the connections between makeup and the subordination of

midriff—would still pass muster under the proposed approach. Further, an appearance
policy that permits but does not require employees to conform to sex stereotypes would
also be found lawful under the proposed approach. For instance, if Harrah’s had
permitted but not required its female employees to wear makeup, the policy would not be
found to violate Title VII. Again, this Author’s goal is not to prohibit any mention of
sex in appearance policies but simply to prevent employers from reinforcing gender
inequality by forcibly imposing sex stereotypes upon its employees.
147. N AOMI WOLF , T HE B EAUTY M YTH : H OW I MAGES OF B EAUTY A RE U SED
AGAINST WOMEN 13–19 (1991).
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id.
150. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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women.151 Over the centuries, makeup has signified a variety of ideas
from promiscuity and immorality, to economic wealth, to political and
sexual oppression, and even to racism.152 Here, the forced feminization
of the Personal Best Policy added an unnecessary and uncomfortable
sexual component to Jespersen’s job function, impairing her ability to
maintain authority in the tense atmosphere of gambling and alcohol.153
Although some women may personally enjoy wearing makeup, when an
employer forces its female employee to wear makeup in an environment
that requires the employee to maintain the respect of her unruly customers,
that policy should be found to reinforce the subordination of women in
the workplace.154 As the dissent in the en banc rehearing of Jespersen
affirmed, one need not condemn makeup as inherently offensive to
conclude that forcing female bartenders to wear a full uniform of
makeup to work is based on an impermissible stereotype.155
The second step of the proposed approach requires courts to engage in
an expanded unequal burdens analysis by examining the financial,
temporal, physical, and emotional costs of the policy. As discussed
above, courts already consider the temporal, financial, and physical

151. The Supreme Court has long been willing to look outside the realm of law for
scientific, economic, historical, and sociological information to help guide decisions in
new or uncharted areas and to aid statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (relying on scientific and sociological studies about the
psychological development of teenagers in determining that the execution of individuals
who were under the age of eighteen at the time that they committed the capital crime was
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 170 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (utilizing historical
studies of the U.S. market and financial and banking encyclopedias to determine that
commercial paper was not intended to be treated as an investment security under the
McFadden and Glass-Steagall Acts); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)
(drawing upon sociological studies regarding the susceptibility of college students to
religious indoctrination and the degree of academic freedom at church-related universities in
holding that the Higher Education Act did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11, 495 (1954)
(relying on social science studies about the psychological effect of segregation on black
students in rejecting the “separate but equal” doctrine in public schools).
152. See Kathy Peiss, Making Up, Making Over: Cosmetics, Consumer Culture,
and Women’s Identity, in THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER AND CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 311 (Victoria de Grazia & Ellen Furlough eds., 1996); see also Kathy
Peiss, Feminism and the History of the Face, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BODY 161
(Theodore R. Schatzki & Wolfgang Natter eds., 1996).
153. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004),
aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
154. See Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 11.
155. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1116 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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effort required to comply with appearance policies, but the emotional
costs of compliance are important to consider in an unequal burdens
analysis because they may indicate that the policy is impermissibly
based upon sexist stereotypes. As one critic noted, “By weighing only
time and cost burdens, courts ignore the feelings of degradation that
accompany grooming standards based on harmful prejudices and
stereotypes.”156 In this sense, the unequal burdens test—as it is currently
applied—is an artificial solution because it fails to address the persistence of
sex stereotypes within a seemingly equal policy.157 Demanding rigid
conformity with gender stereotypes, even if enforced with equal vigor
against both sexes, imposes a heavy burden upon employees because the
stereotypes themselves are harmful.158 For example, the psychological
burden inherent in the notion that women must comply with “artificial,
exacting, and extensive” makeup requirements in order to appear professional,
whereas men are apparently acceptable without any enhancement, makes
it clear that the Personal Best policy in Jespersen imposed unequal burdens
upon the sexes.159 By considering the emotional cost of complying with
an appearance policy, courts will be better able to determine whether a
particular policy is unduly burdensome to employees because it is based
on sexist stereotypes, thus closing the gap between the unequal burdens
analysis and the offensive stereotype test.
The emotional costs of complying with an appearance policy may
seem to be an overly subjective factor for courts to consider, but it would
surely not be the first time a court has been required to evaluate
intangible harms. Emotional distress claims are recognized in a variety
of settings, most notably in tort law.160 Plaintiffs may even recover for
emotional distress in employment discrimination cases, such as wrongful
termination.161 In the groom and dress context, courts would simply be
required to evaluate the emotional cost of complying with the discriminatory
policy and incorporate that factor in the unequal burdens analysis.
Given the extent to which intangible harms are incorporated in other
bodies of case law, this would not be an overly burdensome task.

156. Miller, supra note 121, at 1364.
157. Id. at 1360.
158. See Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 26–27.
159. Id. at 26.
160. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hoskins, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Recovery
is Foreseeable, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1019 (2006); Robert J. Rhee, A Principled
Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805
(2004).
161. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Gowens, Comment, You Hurt My Feelings, Now Pay Up:
Should Objective Evidence Be Required to Support Claims for Emotional Distress
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases?, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (2003).

536

MALCOM

[VOL. 46: 505, 2009]

6/15/2009 8:09:31 PM

“Looking and Feeling Your Best”
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Another potential criticism of the evaluation of emotional costs might
be that, as the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen opined, the subjective reaction
of a single employee is not enough to provide a basis for a Title VII
challenge.162 The apparent reasoning of this statement is that if the rest
of the employees choose to accept the policy, the policy must be
acceptable. However, as previously noted, Title VII’s protections do
not turn on whether the employee is given a choice to accept the
discriminatory policy along with the job, but whether the policy itself is
discriminatory.163 Thus, if one employee challenges the policy and the
court determines that the policy violates Title VII, that victory is no less
important than if an entire class of employees had done so. Finally, this
criticism ignores the fact that the unequal burdens analysis is a relative
comparison of the entire burden a policy imposes upon each sex, and the
emotional cost of the appearance policy is just one factor in the analysis.
Had the Ninth Circuit applied the second step of the proposed
approach in Jespersen, Jespersen would have had a much stronger case
for arguing that the Personal Best policy imposed a heavier burden on
women. Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed Jespersen’s unequal
burdens claim in part because she failed to submit records regarding the
time and cost of complying with the makeup requirement,164 those were
not the only costs at stake. For Jespersen, the true cost of the Personal
Best policy was not the time it took to apply a full face of makeup
everyday before work, or even the money spent on foundation, blush,
mascara, and lipstick—though these costs are not insignificant—but the
emotional toll of being forced to fit a stereotype of femininity that “made
her feel sick, degraded, exposed” and “took away [her] credibility as an
individual and as a person.”165 In order to comprehensively evaluate
the relative burdens imposed by the Personal Best policy, the Ninth
Circuit should have weighed Jespersen’s emotional response to the
policy and its corresponding impact on her job performance.

162. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 75–78.
164. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110.
165. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)
aff’d on reh’g en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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VI. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION: THE HAIRCUT CASES
The so-called haircut cases broadly affirmed the employer’s right to
restrict male employees’ hair length because hair length is an easily
altered characteristic, and Title VII was not intended to take away an
employer’s right to regulate employees’ appearance.166 As explained
above, these cases are unsound because the holdings are based on the
mutability doctrine, which contradicts Supreme Court precedent and
misinterprets the language and purpose of Title VII.167 It is important to
note that most of the haircut cases took place in the 1970s during an era
of great social and political change. In their zeal to protect employers’
ability to regulate employees’ appearance, presiding courts may have
been influenced by this social context and the kinds of ideas that “longhaired youths”168 may have represented. Today, the courts’ and employers’
fervent insistence that male employees’ keep their hair short might seem
unnecessary and unreasonable. Nevertheless, the haircut cases serve as
valid precedent within circuit courts across the country. Thus, a Supreme
Court ruling is necessary to bring about the much needed changes.
Moreover, the myriad problems in the treatment of groom and dress
policies under Title VII arise not out of the statute, but out of lower
courts’ misguided interpretation of the statute. The text of Title VII sets
out a clear and succinct definition of discrimination. Yet circuit courts
have imposed several broad limitations upon enforcement of Title VII
violations. These court-created restrictions have thwarted Congress’s intent
in enacting Title VII.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment’s proposed two-pronged approach for groom and dress
policies under Title VII will return the focus to the statute’s original purpose
of eliminating the traditional barriers to women in the workplace by
discerning whether the policy at hand is rooted in stereotypes that
reinforce gender inequality. This new method will also comport with
existing Supreme Court precedent from Phillips and Price Waterhouse

166. See supra Part IV.A.
167. See supra Part IV.A.
168. Indeed, the seminal haircut case, Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), illustrates this point. In Willingham, the Fifth Circuit
noted that an “International Pop Festival” had recently been held in a neighboring village
and was attended by 400,000 to 500,000 young people. Id. at 1087. “Bearded and longhaired youths and scantily dressed young women flooded the countryside. Use of drugs
and marijuana was open.” Id. Thus, the employer was entitled to consider that the business
community of Macon was “particularly sour on youthful long-haired males at the time of
Willingham’s application.” Id.
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because it interprets the protections of Title VII broadly and without any
of the false limitations imposed by circuit courts.
This new approach rejects the mutability doctrine because it conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent and fundamentally misinterprets the
language and purpose of Title VII. Moreover, the mutability doctrine must
be discarded in its entirety because any application of the doctrine would
deny Title VII review over groom and dress policies, due simply to
the fact that they regulate mutable characteristics. Meanwhile, this
new approach combines and refines aspects of the offensive stereotype
analysis and the unequal burdens test to mitigate some of the limitations
and weaknesses produced by the tests in their existing format.
First, the court should determine whether the policy is motivated by or
relies upon stereotypes that tend to reinforce gender inequality in the
workplace. The court should examine the policy in the context of the
historical and cultural roots of the subordination of women, and if the
appearance requirement is based upon a stereotype that has been used to
demean, stigmatize, or oppress women, the stereotype is impermissible
and the policy violates Title VII. If, however, the appearance requirement is
benign, or even beneficial, to the sex upon which it is imposed, the
policy does not violate Title VII.
At the second stage of the analysis, the court should inquire whether
the policy in question imposes a heavier burden of compliance on one
sex over the other. The court should examine the individual restrictions
and requirements of the policy, rather than the policy as a whole, and it
should consider a wide range of factors, including the temporal,
financial, physical, and emotional costs of compliance. If the policy is
found to impose a more stringent or burdensome standard against one
sex over the other, the policy violates Title VII.
Darlene Jespersen risked a successful, twenty-year career by refusing
to conform to an appearance policy that she believed to be unlawful,
unnecessary, and even harmful to her job performance.169 She stated
that the makeup requirement made her feel “very degraded and very
demeaned,” and impaired her ability to command the respect of her
unruly customers.170 Under the approach advocated by this Comment,
Jespersen would have likely been successful in her Title VII claim.

169. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077–78.
170. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
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Under the first prong of this approach, the Personal Best policy at
Harrah’s Casino violates Title VII because it is based on historically
sexist stereotypes that portray women as passive, decorative sex objects,171
and thus impermissibly reinforces gender inequality in the workplace.
Even if a court upheld the policy under the first prong, the policy’s
makeup requirement imposes a heavier burden on female employees by
requiring them to apply a complicated and expensive palette of makeup
while men have no comparable requirement.172 Thus, despite Jespersen’s
disappointing loss before the Ninth Circuit, this Author hopes that women
like Jespersen continue to bring their groom and dress challenges before
the courts. The publicity and controversy surrounding such cases173 may
encourage the Supreme Court to implement a new and more comprehensive
method for analyzing groom and dress policies under Title VII,
emphasizing an approach that will remain faithful to legislative intent
and Supreme Court precedent by eradicating the harmful stereotypes
faced all too often by women in the workforce.

171. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
172. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
173. See, e.g., Jon Christensen, Rouge Rogue, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 22,
available at http://www.mother jones.com/news/hellraiser/2001/03/hellraiser.html; Jackson
Lewis LLP, Harrah’s Policy Requiring Women to Wear Makeup Upheld by Federal
Appeals Court, DAILY RECORDER, Feb. 23, 2005, available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/
legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=731; Judith A. Moldover, Maddened by Makeup, Law.com
(Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1156425446367.
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